# **Code-Based Cryptography for FPGAs**



Dr. Ruben Niederhagen, February 8, 2018



public-key cryptography



public-key cryptography classic post-quantum





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  - Long history of research.



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  - High-throughput scenario: web server...
  - Low-energy scenario: embedded devices, SmartCards, ...



- Code-based schemes are well-understood:
  - Long history of research.
  - Security parameters widely accepted.
- Code-based schemes are expensive:
  - High-throughput scenario: web server...
  - Low-energy scenario: embedded devices, SmartCards, ...
- $\implies$  Hardware implementation as accelerator and for efficiency.



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Introduction
Error-Correcting Codes — McEliece and Niederreiter
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**Algorithm 1:** Key-generation algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : System parameters: *m*, *t*, and *n*.

**Output:** Private key  $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$  and public key K.

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- ${\bf s}\,$  Compute the  $t\times n$  parity check matrix

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} 1/g(\alpha_0) & 1/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & 1/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \alpha_0/g(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \alpha_0^{t-1}/g(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1^{t-1}/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{t-1}/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}.$$



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- 2 Choose a random irreducible polynomial g(x) of degree t. 3 Compute the  $t \times n$  parity check matrix

Permute list of all 
$$2^m$$
 elements, pick the first  $n$  elements.  

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1/q(\alpha_0) & 1/q(\alpha_1) & \cdots & 1/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ n-1/g(\alpha_{n-1}) & \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \alpha_0^{t-1}/g(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1^{t-1}/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{t-1}/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}$$

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### Permute list of all $2^m$ elements, pick the first n elements.

- **Option 1:** Use Fisher-Yates shuffle.
  - Biased if not well implemented,
  - non-biased implementations need floating-point arithmetic or are not constant time.



### Permute list of all $2^m$ elements, pick the first n elements.

- Option 1: Use Fisher-Yates shuffle.
  - Biased if not well implemented,
  - non-biased implementations need floating-point arithmetic or are not constant time.
- **Option 2:** Use a constant-time sorting algorithm.

Sample  $2^m$  random 32-bit values  $r_i$ .

Generate a list of tuples  $\{(r_0, 0), (r_i, 1), \dots, (r_{2^m-1}, a^{m-1} + a^{m-2} \dots + a + 1)\}$ . Sort list by the first element.

Obtain the permutation by reading the second elements.

Expensive: more cycles, more logic.



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### Generate an irreducible polynomial of degree t.

- **Option 1:** Randomly chose *t* + 1 coefficients, check if obtained polynomial is irreducible.
  - Needs about t iterations
    - $\Rightarrow$  not constant time,
  - checking for irreducibility is expensive (extended Euclidean algorithm).



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- **Option 1:** Randomly chose *t* + 1 coefficients, check if obtained polynomial is irreducible.
  - Needs about t iterations
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  - checking for irreducibility is expensive (extended Euclidean algorithm).
- Option 2: Construct an irreducible polynomial.
  - Idea: Compute minimal polynomial of an element  $r \in \mathbb{F}(2^m)[x]/f$  with  $\deg(f) = t$ .
  - Compute several powers in  $\mathbb{F}(2^m)[x]/f$ ,
  - solve a linear equation system over  $\mathbb{F}(2^m)$  of dimension  $t \times t + 1$ .



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- 4 Transform H to a  $mt \times n$  binary parity check matrix  $H^{\prime}.$
- **5** Transform H' into its systematic form  $[\mathbb{I}_{mt}|K]$ .


**Algorithm 1:** Key-generation algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : System parameters: m, t, and n.

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Algorithm 2: Encryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : Plaintext e, public key K.

**Output:** Ciphertext *c*.

1 Compute  $c = [\mathbb{I}_{mt}|K] \times e$ .



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- **2** Return the ciphertext c.



**Algorithm 3:** Decryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : Ciphertext c, secret key  $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$ . **Output:** Plaintext e.

1 Compute the double-size  $2t \times n$  parity check matrix

$$H^{(2)} = \begin{bmatrix} 1/g^{2}(\alpha_{0}) & 1/g^{2}(\alpha_{1}) & \cdots & 1/g^{2}(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \alpha_{0}/g^{2}(\alpha_{0}) & \alpha_{1}/g^{2}(\alpha_{1}) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}/g^{2}(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \alpha_{0}^{2t-1}/g^{2}(\alpha_{0}) & \alpha_{1}^{2t-1}/g^{2}(\alpha_{1}) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{2t-1}/g^{2}(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}$$

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**2** Transform  $H^{(2)}$  to a  $2mt \times n$  binary parity check matrix  $H'^{(2)}$ .

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- **2** Transform  $H^{(2)}$  to a  $2mt \times n$  binary parity check matrix  $H'^{(2)}$ .
- **3** Compute the double-size syndrome:  $S^{(2)} = H'^{(2)} \times (c|0)$ .

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- **2** Transform  $H^{(2)}$  to a 2mt imes n binary parity check matrix  $H'^{(2)}$ .
- ${\bf 3}$  Compute the double-size syndrome:  $S^{(2)}=H^{\prime(2)}\times (c|0).$
- 4 Compute the error-locator polynomial  $\sigma(x)$  from  $S^{(2)}$ .



**Algorithm 3:** Decryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

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**Algorithm 3:** Decryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : Ciphertext *c*, secret key  $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$ . **Output:** Plaintext *e*.

$$H^{(2)} = \begin{bmatrix} 1/g^2(\alpha_0) & 1/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & 1/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \alpha_0/g^2(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ Evaluate g and \sigma at all 2^m elements using additive FFT. \\ 2 \text{ Transform } H^{(2)} \text{ to a } 2mt \times n \text{ binary parity check matrix } H^{(2)}. \\ 3 \text{ Compute the double-size syndrome: } S^{(2)} = H'^{(2)} \times (c|0). \\ 4 \text{ Compute the error-locator polynomial } \sigma(x) \text{ from } S^{(2)}. \\ 5 \text{ Evaluate the error-locator polynomial } \sigma(x) \text{ at } (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}). \\ \end{bmatrix}$$



**Algorithm 3:** Decryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : Ciphertext c, secret key  $(q(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$ . **Output:** Plaintext *e*.

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Efficient decoding algorithm.  

$$\begin{bmatrix} \ddots & \vdots \\ g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}$$

- 2 Transform  $H^{(2)}$  to a  $2mt \times n$  binary parity check matrix  $H'^{(2)}$ . 3 Compute the double-size syndrome:  $S^{(2)} = H'^{(2)} \times (c|0)$ . 4 Compute the error-locator polynomial  $\sigma(x)$  from  $S^{(2)}$ .

- **5** Evaluate the error-locator polynomial  $\sigma(x)$  at  $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{n-1})$ .



## Efficient decoding algorithm:

- **Option 1:** Patterson algorithm.
  - Not constant time,
  - side-channel attacks can be used to decode messages.



### Efficient decoding algorithm:

- **Option 1:** Patterson algorithm.
  - Not constant time,
  - side-channel attacks can be used to decode messages.
- **Option 2:** Berlekamp-Massey algorithm.
  - Constant time.



**Required Modules:** 

• Finite field arithmetic in  $\mathbb{F}(2^m)$ .



- Finite field arithmetic in  $\mathbb{F}(2^m)$ .
- Polynomial arithmetic in  $\mathbb{F}(2^m)[x]/f$ .



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### Design Key Generation



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## Design

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- ${\bf s}\,$  Compute the  $t\times n$  parity check matrix

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#### Design Encryption



**Algorithm 4:** Encryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : Plaintext e, public key K.

**Output:** Ciphertext *c*.

1 Compute 
$$c = [\mathbb{I}_{mt}|K] \times e$$
.

**2** Return the ciphertext c.

### Design Decryption





# Design

Algorithm 3: Decryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

**Input** : Ciphertext c, secret key  $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$ . **Output:** Plaintext e.

$$H^{(2)} = \begin{bmatrix} 1/g^2(\alpha_0) & 1/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & 1/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \alpha_0/g^2(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \alpha_0^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}$$

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- 4 Compute the error-locator polynomial  $\sigma(x)$  from  $S^{(2)}$ .
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### Design Decryption







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# Recommended system parameters (for 266-bit security):

- finite field  $2^m$ : m = 13
- number of errors: t = 119
- code length: n = 6960

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#### Performance

	Cycle	S				
Case	Key-Gen Dec. Lo		Logic	Mem.	Reg.	Fmax
area	$11,\!121,\!214$	$34,\!492$	$53,\!447(\!23\%)$	907 (35%)	$118,\!243$	$245 \; \mathrm{MHz}$
bal.	$3,\!062,\!936$	22,768	$70,\!478(30\%)$	915(36%)	$146,\!648$	$251 \; \mathrm{MHz}$
time	966,400	$17,\!055$	$121,\!806(52\%)$	961(38%)	$223,\!232$	$248 \; \mathrm{MHz}$

Table: Performance for the entire Niederreiter cryptosystem (i.e., key generation, encryption, and decryption) including the serial IO interface when synthesized for the Stratix V (5SGXEA7N) FPGA.



#### Performance Comparison

		Cycles			Freq.	Mem.	Time (ms)				
	Gen.	Dec.	Enc.		(MHz)		Gen.	Dec.	Enc.		
m = 11, t = 50, n = 2048, Virtex 5 LX110											
Shoufan et a	l. 14,670,000	$210,\!300$	81,500	$14{,}537{}(84{}\%)$	163	75	90.00	1.29	0.50		
This design	$1,\!503,\!927$	5,864	$1,\!498$	$6,\!660(38\%)$	180	68	8.35	0.03	0.01		
m=13,t=128,n=8192, Haswell vs. Stratix V											
Chou	$1,\!236,\!054,\!840$	$343,\!344$	$289,\!152$	—	4,000		309.01	0.09	0.07		
This design	$1,\!173,\!750$	$17,\!140$	6,528	$129,\!059(54\%)$	231	$1,\!126$	5.08	0.07	0.07		

Table: Comparison with related work. Logic is given in "Slices" for Xilinx Virtex FPGAs and in "ALMs" for Altera Stratix FPGAs.



Thank you for your attention!



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