

Code-Based Cryptography for FPGAs


Dr. Ruben Niederhagen, February 8, 2018



public-key cryptography


Introduction

Global Map




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
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
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⇒ Hardware implementation as accelerator and for efficiency.


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Error-Correcting Codes — McEliece and Niederreiter

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
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
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
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
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
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Algorithm 1: Key-generation algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

Input : System parameters: m , t , and n .

Output: Private key $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$ and public key K .

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Permute list of all 2^m elements, pick the first n elements.

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 - non-biased implementations need floating-point arithmetic or are not constant time.

- **Option 2:** Use a constant-time sorting algorithm.

Sample 2^m random 32-bit values r_i .

Generate a list of tuples $\{(r_0, 0), (r_i, 1), \dots, (r_{2^m-1}, a^{m-1} + a^{m-2} \dots + a + 1)\}$.

Sort list by the first element.

Obtain the permutation by reading the second elements.

- Expensive: more cycles, more logic.

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- **Option 2:** Construct an irreducible polynomial.
 - Idea: Compute minimal polynomial of an element $r \in \mathbb{F}(2^m)[x]/f$ with $\deg(f) = t$.
 - Compute several powers in $\mathbb{F}(2^m)[x]/f$,
 - solve a linear equation system over $\mathbb{F}(2^m)$ of dimension $t \times t + 1$.

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Gaussian elimination.

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Algorithm 2: Encryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

Input : Plaintext e , public key K .

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Input : Ciphertext c , secret key $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$.

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- **Option 2:** Berlekamp-Massey algorithm.
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
- Finite field arithmetic in $\mathbb{F}(2^m)$.
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
Design

Key Generation



Design


Key Generation



Design

Key Generation

Goppa Polynomial Gen.



Design

Algorithm 1: Key-generation algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

Input : System parameters: m , t , and n .

Output: Private key $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$ and public key K .


- 1 Choose random sequence $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}(2^m)^n$ of distinct elements.
- 2 Choose a random irreducible polynomial $g(x)$ of degree t .
- 3 Compute the $t \times n$ parity check matrix

$$H = \begin{bmatrix} 1/g(\alpha_0) & 1/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & 1/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \alpha_0/g(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \alpha_0^{t-1}/g(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1^{t-1}/g(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{t-1}/g(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}.$$

- 4 Transform H to a $mt \times n$ binary parity check matrix H' .
- 5 Transform H' into its systematic form $[\mathbb{I}_{mt} | K]$.

Design

Encryption



Algorithm 4: Encryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.


Input : Plaintext e , public key K .

Output: Ciphertext c .

- 1 Compute $c = [\mathbb{I}_{mt}|K] \times e$.
 - 2 Return the ciphertext c .
-

Design

Decryption



Design

Algorithm 3: Decryption algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem.

Input : Ciphertext c , secret key $(g(x), (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}))$.

Output: Plaintext e .


- 1 Compute the double-size $2t \times n$ parity check matrix

$$H^{(2)} = \begin{bmatrix} 1/g^2(\alpha_0) & 1/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & 1/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \alpha_0/g^2(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \alpha_0^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_0) & \alpha_1^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_1) & \cdots & \alpha_{n-1}^{2t-1}/g^2(\alpha_{n-1}) \end{bmatrix}.$$


- 2 Transform $H^{(2)}$ to a $2mt \times n$ binary parity check matrix $H'^{(2)}$.
- 3 Compute the double-size syndrome: $S^{(2)} = H'^{(2)} \times (c|0)$.
- 4 Compute the error-locator polynomial $\sigma(x)$ from $S^{(2)}$.
- 5 Evaluate the error-locator polynomial $\sigma(x)$ at $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1})$.

Design

Decryption



Design Setup



Code generation and module parameters:

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Recommended system parameters (for 266-bit security):

- finite field 2^m : $m = 13$
- number of errors: $t = 119$
- code length: $n = 6960$

Performance

Case	Cycles					
	Key-Gen	Dec.	Logic	Mem.	Reg.	Fmax
area	11,121,214	34,492	53,447 (23%)	907 (35%)	118,243	245 MHz
bal.	3,062,936	22,768	70,478 (30%)	915 (36%)	146,648	251 MHz
time	966,400	17,055	121,806 (52%)	961 (38%)	223,232	248 MHz

Table: Performance for the entire Niederreiter cryptosystem (i.e., key generation, encryption, and decryption) including the serial IO interface when synthesized for the Stratix V (5SGXEA7N) FPGA.

Performance Comparison

	Gen.	Cycles		Logic	Freq. (MHz)	Mem.	Time (ms)		
		Dec.	Enc.				Gen.	Dec.	Enc.
<i>m = 11, t = 50, n = 2048, Virtex 5 LX110</i>									
Shoufan et al.	14,670,000	210,300	81,500	14,537 (84%)	163	75	90.00	1.29	0.50
This design	1,503,927	5,864	1,498	6,660 (38%)	180	68	8.35	0.03	0.01
<i>m = 13, t = 128, n = 8192, Haswell vs. Stratix V</i>									
Chou	1,236,054,840	343,344	289,152	—	4,000	—	309.01	0.09	0.07
This design	1,173,750	17,140	6,528	129,059 (54%)	231	1,126	5.08	0.07	0.07

Table: Comparison with related work. Logic is given in “Slices” for Xilinx Virtex FPGAs and in “ALMs” for Altera Stratix FPGAs.

Thank you for your attention!

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